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ABSTRACT 
 
This article suggests that at national and local levels, the 
British state is seemingly incapable of solving multi-faceted and 
intractable social, economic and environmental problems alone. It is 
argued that new national and local governance arrangements, based on 
new ideas, different ways of working, and approaches to problem 
solving have brought into a sharper focus on the issues of democratic 
legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability. All three complex and 
ambiguous concepts have long been a concern in public administration. 
This article draws from existing conceptual frameworks to show that 
traditional forms of legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability are now 
under threat. It examines the merits of the new forms, with some 
recommendations for the future.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like many other nation states, the UK state has 
undergone massive transformation in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, and there is no evidence of a slow down. 
As the Blair Government continues to foster a 
managerialist state based largely on neoliberal assumptions 
and business--like policies, innovative and experimental, 
reconfigured and re-engineered forms of governance have 
replaced the traditional top--down, command hierarchies. 
New arrangements in which state and non-state actors work 
together across organisational boundaries to achieve 
commonly agreed objectives have exposed gaps in 
institutional coverage and challenged the democratic 
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legitimacy of both state and non- state actors, but more 
significantly scrutiny and accountability remain key 
unresolved issues at the heart of modernisation of the 
British state. State officials are now obliged to draw in 
personnel, resources and information from non--state actors 
to share “democratic action spaces”, and new relationships 
and responsibilities are altering the forms of democratic 
engagement and patterns of legitimacy. 
As the context of governance continues to change, 
and more and more state functions are contracted out, 
privatised, or delivered by combinations of state and non--
state actors or agencies we need to rethink our views on 
legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability. While states 
continue to divest financial and managerial responsibilities 
and measure performance on market driven criteria such as 
consumerism, competition, efficiency and value for money 
questions remain on issues of equity and public interest. If, 
as is argued here, the British state has undergone massive 
transformation and national and local governance 
arrangements are now so completely different to those we 
have grown used to, this is an apposite juncture to develop 
new forms of legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability. To 
examine these new forms it is important to understand 
some existing debates surrounding the concepts of 
“governance”, “New Public Management”, “New Public 
Services”, and “New Public Governance”.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF “GOVERNANCE” 
 
Although the use of the concept “governance” has 
attained currency within the past decade, at the expense of 
the concept “government” (Hirst, 2000), and despite its 
widespread usage, it remains a concept with different 
dimensions and applications (Salet, Thornley, and 
Kreukels, 2003:9). “Governance” lacks precision and is 
used in a variety of disciplines and in different discourses 
 
 (Southern, 2003). It is generally perceived as an alternative 
to government. From a North American perspective it has 
been variously described as “social self governance”, in 
association with contemporary ideas on local and global 
civic societies; as “responsible economic governance”, 
linked to market economies; or “political governance”; 
concerning public affairs. The first two are, in part, private 
forms of governance, facilitated by governmental 
frameworks, whereas the latter is concerned with the theory 
and practice of public affairs.  
In a European context, some have argued that 
national governments, during the post Second World War 
period took a pro-active role in expansion of the Welfare 
State, whereas during the 1980s, and thereafter, dramatic 
shifts altered the balance between government and other 
agencies. The degree of changes to governmental forms 
across Europe varied between countries, but in the post-
1980 period common features such as a reduction in the 
proactive role of government in the economy and society, 
diversification of decision making throughout a wide range 
of organisations and a restructuring of inter-governmental 
relationships became evident (Salet, Thornley, and 
Kreukels, 2003:6). 
There is no real agreement on why governmental 
institutions have been replaced by new forms of 
governance. It is generally thought that rapid global and 
technological changes and the resultant international inter-
dependence, coupled with declining growth rates and 
increasing competitive pressures within states, have 
brought about this change. Other influences include 
shrinking budgets for social programmes, the blurring of 
boundaries between business and government and 
dissatisfaction with legal processes for solving complex 
problems are important reasons for the changes.  
Very little, it is argued is accomplished by a single 
organisation acting alone and in an era when organisational 
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boundaries are loosening and becoming more complex and 
problematic, most organisational problems need partners, 
not only horizontally in alliances but also vertically around 
relationships with users and consumers (Attwood, Pedler, 
Pritchard, and Wilkinson, 2003:143).  Increasingly, new 
standards of delivery are now matched by exhortations to 
join up practice and involve service users (Attwood, Pedler, 
Pritchard, and Wilkinson, 2003:1). Indeed the UK Labour 
Government’s aim for radical modernisation of public 
services depends on its ability to make a reality of 
“holistic” government, “joined up thinking”, and achieve 
better outcomes across a wide range of policy areas, as 
successive governments have failed to tackle deep-seated 
problems.  In the drive to join up policy areas, however, 
ever increasing gaps in lines of accountability, scrutiny and 
legitimacy require further examination. 
Hirst offers a definition of governance as “a means 
by which an activity or ensemble of activities is controlled 
or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of 
outcomes according to some established social standard” 
(Hirst, 1997:3). Whereas government has traditionally been 
thought of as the formal institutional structures of decision-
making, new forms of “governance” have blurred the 
boundaries between the state, the market and civil society 
(Geddes, 1997). This new system of governance engages a 
plurality of institutions and organisations alongside state 
agencies to solve particular problems and multi-agency 
partnerships are regarded as the most effective means of 
achieving common goals (Taket and White, 2000:19-20). 
 
 
 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, NEW PUBLIC 
SERVICES, OR NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? 
 
NPM (New Public Management) was regarded as a 
threat to the traditional Westminster bureaucratic model, in 
which anonymous or neutral civil servants offered 
objective advice to Ministers. It created a new performance 
culture, which embodied (apparently) autonomous and 
accountable managers, and increasingly, with assistance 
from special advisors, Think Tanks or external policy 
forums, civil servants became adept at acting in contractual 
and competitive ways to deliver services. The traditional 
language of civil servants based on stability, rules, 
procedures, was replaced by a new vocabulary based on 
managerialism, change, decentralisation, responsiveness, 
creativity, innovation, performance outputs and impacts.  
New Public Management was adopted as an attempt 
to shift from funding organisations and institutions to 
funding performance (Norman, 2003), and public services 
traditionally delivered through government owned 
bureaucracies were increasingly delivered through a 
“mixed economy” (Gray, 1998) of public and private 
organisations competing for available funds. Government 
bureaucracies were reinvented in attempts to reduce costs 
to taxpayers and increase responsiveness to clients and 
citizens (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 but amidst the 
controversy generated by NPM methods there was 
surprisingly little in-depth information about how they 
work on practice (Norman, 2003). 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) presented a new 
public service (NPS) approach as a viable alternative for 
the dichotomy between the old public administration and 
the new public management. It was an attempt to balance 
the advantages of New Public Management (NPM) with the 
emerging requirement for greater public participation in 
public service improvement. NPS theorists emphasize 
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democratic citizenship, and models of community and civil 
society. NPS is intended as a viable alternative to both the 
traditional and the now-dominant managerialist models 
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). According to this 
approach, public sector organisations should be structured 
in such a way that public servants are responsive to 
“citizens” rather than “clients or customers”. The emphasis 
in NPS is not on the steering or rowing functions (Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992), but on how to build public institutions 
based on responsiveness and integrity. Denhardt & 
Denhardt (2000) suggest that NPS is built on seven 
principles: 
• Serve rather than steer, because public policies are 
no longer simply the result of governmental 
decision-making processes. 
• The public interest is the aim, not the by-product. It 
is necessary to establish shared interests and shared 
responsibilities based around a vision for the 
community and a single set of goals. 
• Think strategically, act democratically. Collective 
effort and collaborative processes should exist 
within open and accessible government. 
• Serve citizens, not customers and have a concern 
for the larger community.  
• Accountability is not simple and involves complex 
constellations of institutions and standards.  
• Value people, not just productivity. Processes of 
collaboration and shared leadership should be based 
on respect for people.  
• Value citizenship and public service above 
entrepreneurship. 
Schedler (2000) goes further in showing the loss of 
credibility in New Public Management due to market 
failure in delivering public services, and sees a future in 
which citizens, rather than customers achieve prominence, 
but points out that greater clarification on the role of the 
 
 state as guarantor and /or regulator will be vital. A new 
public governance, it is argued, would strengthen 
democratic control over decision making and citizen 
involvement, as well as improving public trust in 
government institutions and types of services provided. 
New Public Management, based on a managerial rationality 
was perceived as lacking sensitivity to the misuse of power, 
and of ignoring the fact that political rationality has an 
inherent drive to increase, limit or control power. Lines of 
accountability are crucial to this process, as the following 
section illustrates. 
 
CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITIES 
 
Accountability is a concept that has lost some its 
former straightforwardness, and come to require constant 
clarification and increasingly complex categorisation 
(Mulgan, 2000). Relationships of accountability in the 
public sector are themselves complex, with public 
managers expected to be responsive and accountable to a 
wide range of actors. The terms scrutiny, legitimacy and 
accountability are surrounded by much jargon and to add to 
definitional problems the latter is often confused with 
notions of responsibility. It is therefore more appropriate to 
adopt a multi-perspective conceptual framework to 
examine these concepts and their validity in a UK context. 
We also need to locate the examination within some of the 
debates surrounding changing national and local 
governance structures resulting from the realignment 
between government, the private sector and civil society 
(Geddes, 1997). 
There is general agreement that accountability is 
associated with the process of being called to account to 
some authority for one’s actions (Stewart, 1992:2), and that 
public accountability rests both on giving an account and 
being held to account (Norman, 2003:144). However the 
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present crisis in accountability is due to emerging patterns 
of governance which places an ever increasing burden on a 
single line of accountability. The reality for many public 
servants is that they are pulled in different directions by 
varied mechanisms of accountability. Tensions mount as 
they seek to explain who does what, and more significantly 
who is responsible for how the “rules of the game” have 
altered.  
The origins of accountability may be political, 
constitutional, statutory, hierarchical or contractual and 
may consist of four components: Assignment of 
responsibilities; an obligation to answer for those 
responsibilities; surveillance of performance to ensure 
compliance with direction; and possible sanctions and 
rewards (Norman, 2003:144). It involves answering the 
following questions:  
• Outputs: What has been achieved with resources 
allocated? 
• Ownership: Is a department (or part of the 
government/organisation) well placed to meet the 
demands placed on it now and in future? 
• Strategic alignment and collective interests: Are the 
goals consistent with the government’s strategic 
goals? 
• Contribution to outcomes:  How well is the 
organisation doing in contributing to better 
outcomes? (Norman, 2003; 144).  
Accountability in the UK is managed at multiple levels, and 
traditionally those exercising power were held to account 
through a line of accountability to elected persons, who 
were in turn held to account by citizens in periodic 
elections, and based on a presumption that due processes 
and the observance of procedures to ensure responsible 
public action. Most public servants have multiple 
accountabilities, and their freedom to use discretion is 
governed by the rules, regulations and guidelines 
 
 emanating from central government or a higher authority 
(Friend, Power, and Yewlett, 1974). Moreover their 
understanding of the general rules, conditions and 
knowledge governing their own professional arena (such as 
land use, social services, education), lead to more complex 
and dynamic forms of legitimacy, scrutiny, and 
accountability, at both national and state levels, as we shall 
now examine.  
 
THE NATIONAL STATE 
 
Within the UK national and local state, the drive to 
modernise Government and involve variegated 
communities of interest in decision-making is central to 
understanding the national state’s Modernising 
Government agenda. This is focused on achieving the twin 
aims of efficient public services and equity of distribution 
(Maddock, 2002). Indeed the 1997 Blair Government’s 
three key aims for improving the quality of public services, 
were (i) modernisation and innovation of services, (ii) 
renewed social democracy with an emphasis on welfare, 
and because big Government is dead (iii) partnership as the 
key to delivery (Blair, 1998). To achieve these aims the 
Blair government has welcomed, and indeed encouraged 
new forms of governance, but they have challenged 
legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability. 
Traditionally accountability, at national level, has 
been through Cabinet Ministers; Civil Servants; Select 
committees; central departments; Members of Parliament; 
National Audit Office; the Audit Commission or other 
regulatory agencies; HM Treasury; the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, or locally through Cabinet or Committee 
systems in local government via local members. Direct 
accountability in local government was via officials to 
elected members, and nationally civil servants to Ministers, 
and indirectly appointed boards were accountable through 
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Ministers to Parliament and through council members to 
full council. However traditional forms of public 
accountability no longer provide a sufficient basis for 
explanation, and the complexities of public life and the 
greater demands placed on officials and elected members 
raise further doubts (Stewart, 1992:4). 
In the traditional perspective on national political 
accountability there is a coherent chain of accountability, 
from official to official in the Weberian bureaucracy, from 
official to Minister, from Minister to Parliament, and from 
Parliament the people, but it is largely illusionary 
(McGarvey, 2001), Accountability is still at the heart of 
public policy and politics, but recent changes have created 
many tensions and difficulties as normal channels of 
accountability between the governors and the governed 
become strained, and difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless 
we should not entirely dismiss the traditional view of 
accountability, because civil servants still derive their own 
code of ethics from an understanding of their place in the 
hierarchy and their relationship to Ministers, other civil 
servants, parliament, Cabinet, and the general public 
interest (Chapman, 1993). 
Since 1997 the Labour Government has pushed the 
Modernising Agenda of change affecting many 
constitutional, structures, practices and procedures. Unlike 
other countries, the British system of government lacks a 
written constitution, a Freedom of Information Act or a Bill 
of Rights and this has enabled the government of the day 
(Labour has remained in power since 1997 and now enjoys 
a 160 seat majority in Parliament) to instigate changes that 
have affected lines of accountability.  
Parliamentary accountability has been traditionally 
through the channel of representative MPs (Members of 
Parliament) who question the action of the Executive 
through parliamentary questioning and scrutiny and select 
committee. The Prime Minister, as Primus Inter Pares (first 
 
 among equals) is responsible for choosing a Cabinet and 
the leading government Ministerial teams. Under the 
current Government the duration of both Cabinet meetings 
and Prime Minister’s Question Time have been shortened, 
leaving many backbench MPs to use the select committee 
system as their only legitimate way of bringing the 
executive to account, and leading many commentators to 
suggest a more Presidential style of politics than has be 
hitherto experienced in a British context. 
Professional accountability in which public officials 
drew their codes of conduct from a body of professional 
knowledge and expertise had been undermined by NPM 
and the new governance arrangements, as individuals and 
groups were expected to put aside their professional 
training and experience in the interests of the public weal. 
By increasingly working across professional boundaries 
and in completely new jurisdictions it is clear that the 
professional perspective on standards and guidance that 
governs behaviour was in retreat, as professional bodies 
attempted to offer guidance to public servants working in 
completely new contexts and environments. 
Public servants expect to be vertically accountable 
by political, managerial, and financial interests and other 
processes of inspection and regulation, but they are also 
internally accountable to their own organisational scrutiny 
and accountability mechanisms, as well as vertical and 
horizontally to a variety of stakeholders (of an increasingly 
multi- governance level, multi-professional. multi-
constituent, and multi-agency nature) 
Until recently, for all day to day purposes, civil servants 
had loyalty and duty to the Crown and Queens Parliament, 
and if they were unhappy with this line of authority they 
could resign (Chapman, 1993). However, many high profile 
cases such as the Ponting case in 1985 (a civil servant who 
leaked information to Parliament because he believed his 
Minister was lying to Parliament) have increased the 
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sensitivity for individual civil servants. Ministerial 
accountability to parliament was of a higher order than 
nowadays and Ministers rarely resign over issues. Such 
cases have led to: 
• Reforms of Parliamentary Select Committees, 
where MP s can examine officials and Ministers and 
probe minute details. Various documents of 
guidance were issued to civil servants (1977). 
• The Croham directive on the Disclosure of Official 
information, which was followed by the Osmotherly 
Rules. 
• A 1985 statement by Sir Robert Armstrong, (revised 
in 1987), The Head of the Home Civil Service and 
Cabinet Office, on the duties and responsibilities of 
Civil Servants in relation to Ministers. 
There is a draft Civil Service Bill presently being 
considered by the Public Administration Select Committee 
of the House of Commons, and there are demands for a 
Civil Service Act, mainly to clarify the relationship and 
codes of conduct between Civil Servants and Ministers and 
Civil Servants and the many special advisors or external 
experts being used by Ministers (House of Commons, 
2003). 
Decentralisation of decision making and budgets 
has strengthened the need for central co-ordination and HM 
Treasury has become more powerful, but there has been a 
fine balancing act between exercising strong central 
leadership and fostering a model of decentralisation On the 
one hand there is the rhetoric of decentralised decision 
making, but on the other hand little guidance on how to 
achieve outcomes. Accountability becomes blurred when 
the central agencies (in particular when the ultimate funder, 
HM Treasury, fails to give clear instructions and delivery 
agencies are left to guess on how to interpret the guidance). 
HM Treasury remains the most important line of 
accountability because of the requirement of Accounting 
 
 Officers of the spending departments to give regular 
updates on spending. It has the ability to influence spending 
priorities in departments. The key role as co-ordinator of 
overall government spending gives the Treasury and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer a powerful role as the key 
agent of accountability. Many Chief Executives of Next 
Steps (arms--length) agencies have short-term contracts and 
have strictly limited room for manoeuvre. This means that 
they can be removed when necessary, and are continuously 
challenged to provide an account of their activities. 
It has been argued that traditional notions of 
political accountability are gone forever (McGarvey, 
2001:25) but still inform political behaviour The 
professional accountability of the post war period in which 
technical and apparent de-politicised solutions to public 
services were in fact an attempt to increase resources 
available to professionals, but went into retreat. 
Managerialist accountability, based on the notions of New 
Public Management, replaced both political and 
professional notions of accountability, and had a core the 
belief that accountability required a clear statement of 
objectives and target setting, and that a direct relationship 
between administrators and users of public services would 
improve management, and that choice, and empowerment 
would deliver more responsive, effective and accountable 
services (McGarvey, 2001:20). However the new 
governance framework involving non--state actors and 
agencies is threatening the managerial perspective, and 
requires a reworking of our traditional ideas and views of 
the role of the state and the effectiveness of representative 
democracy (Hirst, 2000: 33). In the meantime there has 
been an escalation in the types of scrutiny, regulation and 
inspection, as the following section illustrates. 
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SCRUTINY, REGULATION AND INSPECTION: 
CHALLENGES TO EXISTING FORMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Scrutiny through inspection and audit has become 
more prominent in the UK system and Moran points to the 
rise of surveillance, audit and regulation (Moran, 2000). 
Where once the audit function would have been seen as the 
prerogative of service professionals it is now in the hands 
of arms length (and supposedly independent) regulatory 
bodies. The command and control systems of 
accountability have been replaced by a regulatory mode. 
There are now public auditors, professional inspectorates 
and ombudsmen, and in theory they are independent, 
objective and assess measurable indicators of performance 
to nationally established standards (Rogers, 1990:129). The 
regulatory mode of accountability is based on 
managerialism and control and downplays democracy; 
pluralism and the conventional view that government 
ministers are at the apex of democratic accountability and 
control (McGarvey, 2001:24). 
Public service regulation is a control mechanism by 
which central government seeks to govern the activities of 
those agencies providing public services. Agencies such as 
the Audit commission, National Audit Office and central 
government Inspectorates allow the centre to govern 
increasingly fragmented governance. They monitor, 
influence and control the performance of agencies 
delivering public services (Cope and Goodship, 1999). The 
Audit Commission has developed an array of performance 
indicators (and use the Best Value Regime or 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment to benchmark 
local authorities against each other); HMI Constabulary 
issues certificates of efficiency; OFSTED (Standards in 
schools) constructs league tables of schools; and District 
Audit, National Audit Office, and the Audit Commission 
 
 and IDEA (Improvement and Development Agency ) audit 
the spending and performance of local authorities, with the 
objective of spreading good practice. 
There is a big question mark over where audit ends 
and inspection begins as regulatory agencies often have 
different remits, agendas, and styles and compete with each 
other, resulting in frequent turf wars. Cope and Goodship 
(1999:14) see moves toward more joined up government 
hindered by the way in which state agencies are still 
functionally and vertically organised, and the fact there are 
still entrenched interests of politicians, bureaucrats and 
professionals (Cope and Goodship, 1999:14). 
Scrutiny processes are likely to stay fractious 
between central government with its desire for reform, and 
service providers who are trying to lessen the burden that 
scrutiny brings, by concentrating their limited resources on 
service provision. The audit explosion has challenged 
delivery agencies, increased the tensions, and led to either 
increased use of management consultancy or prescriptive 
models of best practice. The future of regulation and audit 
depends very much on the potential for a lighter touch or 
the development of greater trust between the parties 
(Clarke, 2003:157), but undoubtedly measurement as a 
form of accountability is here to stay. In the next section we 
examine some current practices.  
 
MEASURING SERVICE QUALITY AS A FORM OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Quality of service improvement is based on the idea 
that greater accountability and transparency for the 
consumer will enable them to engage more effectively and 
demand higher standards. Since the 1980s countless quality 
initiatives have been introduced by central government, 
such as Market Testing; Citizen’s Charter; Service First; 
Public Sector Excellence (based on the EFQM, European 
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Foundation for Quality Management model); CCT; Best 
Value; IDEA and Audit Commission Reviews; CPA 
(Comprehensive Performance Assessment); Accreditation 
of local strategic partnerships (such as local strategic 
partnerships and New Deal for Communities); and a 
Partnership Diagnostic that is being developed by Audit 
Commission.  
The context within which these initiatives have taken 
place include: (a) worldwide competition for shrinking 
markets; (b) the domination of industrial/technological and 
managerial ideas by Far Eastern companies; (c) rising 
demands from a more highly skilled workforce; (d) a 
shortage of the world’s resources; (e) the need to eliminate 
waste; and (f) a dominant political ideology in the UK 
focused on a wasteful bureaucratic state, inadequate public 
service delivery and cradle to grave state dependency. 
The need to measure performance against central 
government targets, against performance in previous 
periods and against other departments or benchmark 
against other agencies is at the heart of the performance 
regime. The aim is to allow organisations to develop 
benchmarks, norms and targets of their own to improve 
policy, planning and budgeting, monitor and implement 
improved standards of service delivery, but at the same 
time review the distribution of resources, and ensure access 
to all users. Nevertheless it is clear that the performance 
management systems imposed on the public sector are also 
a designed to increase central control and influence over 
how decisions are taken at the local state level, as we shall 
now discuss. 
 
THE LOCAL STATE 
 
The Local Government Code of Conduct, like the Civil 
Service Code of Conduct at national state level, developed 
as a result of the Nolan principles on conduct in public life. 
 
 Moreover, all appointments to public bodies follow Nolan 
guidelines, and are monitored very closely by the Office of 
Public Appointments, overseen by the Parliamentary 
Standards and Privileges Committee. Public Servants are 
also accountable to their own ethical standards (because 
accountability is considered to be intuitive), but much of 
their work is now enshrined in the Nolan principles, of 
which accountability is but one of the key elements that 
should guide their activities (the other six are selflessness, 
integrity, objectivity, openness, honesty and leadership). 
Accountability may have little validity without some clear 
evidence that the other six principles, and as well as being 
accountable to their own professional training, public 
servants are accountable upwards to central government by 
regular inspection. Some examples are: 
• Audit Commission or District Audit or the 
Standards Board of England, (in the case of local 
government); 
• The Commission for Health Audit and Inspection 
and Commission for Social Care Inspection (health 
and social care systems); and 
• HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (the police).  
At heart, the plethora of regulation, audit and measurement 
of UK public services, were designed to minimise 
misappropriation of funds and reduce occurrences of 
untoward and unacceptable behaviours. 
In terms of local accountability the notion that elected 
local government has a legitimate and automatic role in 
making authoritative local decisions on behalf of their 
communities is severely challenged. In the UK, like most 
of its Western European counterparts, local governance 
evolved from earlier nineteenth and twentieth century 
institutionalised forms, in which public decisions were 
institutionalised in public bureaucracies and political 
parties largely created and legitimised by central states, to a 
“more variegated, independent and more experimental form 
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of local politics offering the potential for politicians, 
bureaucrats, interest groups and publics to express their 
local identities, different from, but complementary to 
higher tiers of governance (John, 2001:2). As a 
consequence political authority is now being devolved to 
groupings of wider agencies, which are exhorted to work in 
collaboration with formerly marginalized community 
groups.  
Under the Local Government Act 2000 local authorities 
with a population of more than 85, 000 were asked to 
choose, after broad consultation, from the following four 
alternative mechanisms of internal decision-making 
systems: Streamlined Committee Structure; Elected 
Mayor/City Manager; Cabinet and Scrutiny 
Committee/Panel; and City Manager and Administration.  
Prior to these changes all local authorities were 
organised around a Committee structure with members 
acting as representatives, and officers recruited to offer 
advice, on the basis of technical expertise. To date twelve 
UK local authorities have opted for an elected Mayor; one 
chose a Mayor/Council Manager option; approximately 
seventy chose a streamlined committee structure, but by far 
the majority of all local authorities opted for Cabinet 
Leadership with a series of scrutiny committees or panels 
(Leach and Norris, 2003). In the latter option the Cabinet 
makes most of the decisions and has direct overall control 
of the work of the council. Membership is drawn from the 
majority or ruling party, and each Cabinet member is 
designated a policy portfolio. In a departure from 
traditional committee/departmental scrutiny, portfolio 
functions cut across council services to encourage joined up 
thinking.  
Many councils have established Area Committees 
or Panels to bring the council and communities closer 
together, for the purpose of making decisions on a range of 
different local issues, such as traffic schemes, parking or 
 
 monitoring and evaluating the progress of local 
regeneration schemes. In some, but not all instances, Area 
Forums link town and parish forums into a plethora of 
partnerships, consortia or other joint working arrangements. 
The ruling party in each local authority holds 
cabinet positions, and some even allow a restricted number 
of opposition representatives to sit in cabinet. Each member 
has a Portfolio of service responsibility. Unlike the 
traditional committee structure where committees followed 
the council departmental structure based on direct 
accountability, many Cabinet systems are organised along 
cross cutting themes (such as Life Long Learning, 
Regeneration, or Sustainability) and cross-departmental 
boundaries. Lines of accountability are therefore more 
amorphous and difficult to discern. Under the traditional 
committee structure, all councillors would carry a case load 
of ward business and be part of the overall Council decision 
making body, but under the new Cabinet system, most 
“backbench” members have lost their intimate role in 
decision making. Instead, some have been drawn into 
scrutinising the role of full Cabinet. These new roles have 
altered the balance of accountability.  
The change from having a committee structure 
directly aligned to service departments, and in which 
members could call officers to account, has altered the 
direct relationship between members and officers, and most 
officers are now deployed in servicing the work of the 
senior Cabinet members of an authority, leaving few 
resources for the ordinary backbencher who wants to ask 
pertinent questions of the Executive of Cabinet members. 
Most local authorities have established scrutiny panels but 
there is no real evidence to suggest that they are being run 
along the lines envisaged by central government i.e. similar 
to the Select Committees in Parliament with the capacity to 
call upon expert witnesses, external advice or 
commissioned research, to bring the Executive to account. 
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Very few local authorities that have adopted the Cabinet 
and Scrutiny system have the resources or manpower to 
service the system. In theory this revolutionary new system 
was designed to allow the citizen to be brought closer to the 
governed, but in reality there is little evidence of lay people 
or community representation on any scrutiny panels as 
most are led by a backbench member who lacks the officer 
support or capacity to bring the Cabinet members to 
account for their actions.  
Some local authorities have hired costly consultants, 
and attempt to have a scrutiny panel to oversee all scrutiny 
panels, but there is no evidence to show any real 
independent scrutiny. The main problems are insufficient 
training of members on what the scrutiny role is supposed 
to achieve, insufficient funds and poor officer support to 
challenge decisions. Moreover, although some scrutiny 
panels can instigate an investigation, in most cases the 
Chief Officer and Cabinet members will determine the 
scope of business to be scrutinised, and this rather defeats 
the object of the exercise. All local authorities also now 
have Standards Panel to monitor the behaviour of members, 
and are being asked to carry out audits of governance, and 
develop procurement strategies to ensure fair distribution of 
contracts for work. Internally, in addition to Scrutiny 
committees/panels, local authorities have also established 
the following: Standards Committees; Regulatory and other 
Committees; Area Committees/Panels; and Joint 
arrangements. 
Scrutiny committees review all council policies, 
proposals and performance, but they can suggest their own 
proposals and consider the outcomes of commissioned 
research. The Scrutiny Committee can investigate and 
decision of Cabinet, under procedures known as call--in 
procedures. This allows for a group of six councillors, three 
ward councillors, the Shadow Cabinet or other opposition 
groups to investigate and scrutinise any area of local 
 
 government work, providing the Scrutiny Committee is in 
agreement. 
Each local authority has different types of scrutiny 
committees, and they all differ in size, scope of activities 
and resources devoted to them. For example, Ealing 
Borough in London, has a borough scrutiny committee to 
investigate physical or infrastructure policies; an area 
committee scrutiny panel to respond to local needs 
(normally they are chaired by councillors and can involve 
community representatives); a regulatory committee to 
make decisions on planning, trading standards, consumer 
protection or environmental health. This latter body 
oversees the work of all regulatory bodies and acts as a link 
between the bodies and the council; and a planning 
committee that scrutinises all planning applications. Joint 
arrangements committees allow Cabinets to enter into 
arrangements or collaborate with any person or body to 
promote the economic, social or environmental well being 
of its area. 
Rules governing the conduct of local government 
council members are enshrined in the Standards Board of 
England’s guidelines, and every local authority must adopt 
specific Codes of Conduct to guide behaviour. Many local 
authorities have also established Standards Committees for 
promoting and maintaining high ethical standards and 
investigating allegations that member’s behaviour may 
have fallen short of required standards.  Every local 
authority was required by May 2002, to develop a Code of 
Conduct setting out the expected behaviours of members. 
This Code covers all elected, co-opted and independent 
members of local authorities, including parish councils, 
police, fire and joint authorities and National Park 
authorities The Code requires individual members to have 
rules and procedures governing abuses of power and 
position, as well as responsible use of authority resources. 
Additionally there are rules governing disclosure of 
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interests and withdrawal from meetings due to vested 
interests or poor behaviour. A record must also be kept on 
all financial and other interests. The Standards Board for 
England oversees the process and deals with any disputes 
or specific transgressions, by instigating procedures, 
nationally or at the local level. Local lay people and 
external experts are appointed nationally to serve locally, 
and they act as a quasi—legal mediator in any disputes. 
Turnout in UK local elections is low (generally below 
30%) but central government is experimenting with new 
electronic forms of voting (and recent evidence has shown 
that this can improve voter turnout). Local government has 
few powers to raise taxes, other than council tax and 
business rates, so there is still a reliance on a block grant 
from central government for 50% of spending, though 
Beacon councils and others that receive high ratings on 
Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
will be given greater financial freedoms after April 2004. 
The low turnout at elections, coupled with the overarching 
financial dependency leaves local government still highly 
accountable to its central government “master”. 
There is also panoply of other regulatory and inspection 
mechanisms to maintain standards, transparency and good 
governance. These are all aimed at improved service, 
customer orientation and value for money, and in addition 
to Best Value and Comprehensive Assessment; Area Panels 
and Area Committees; Local strategic partnerships, New 
Deal for Communities or other partnerships, and Primary 
Care Trusts (to identify local health care needs) have 
recently been established. Democratic accountability is also 
facing huge challenges, in particular as local members and 
officials are expected to work in collaboration with a 
variety of partner organisations to achieve commonly 
agreed objectives. This is true in the case of Local Strategic 
Partnerships where all main agencies in a particular locale 
are brought together for the purpose of mainstreaming 
 
 funding to satisfy local needs within nationally determined 
floor targets. Traditionally local members would act as the 
funnel of representative views to the council, but as many 
decisions are taken out with the council chamber it has 
become increasingly difficult to determine who is 
responsible and accountable for actions. Moreover, the 
question of who has legitimacy to make decisions is of 
crucial importance. 
One of the major problems facing anyone attempting to 
oversee and scrutinise the work of local authorities or 
health bodies is the fact that much of their business is 
conducted in partnership, collaboration, consortia or joint 
working arrangements that cross traditional boundaries. 
Most local authorities took an early lead in bringing 
together partnership agencies to work in completely new 
ways to achieve the central tenets of the Modernising 
Agenda, but the partners are also required to work within a 
Best Value regime and develop suitable PSA (Public 
Service Agreements) and measurable targets based on UK 
Treasury floor targets. Furthermore during the summer of 
2002 150 upper tier local authorities were subjected to a 
“Comprehensive Performance Assessment”. This public 
scrutiny may have profound implications for elected local 
government, as their legitimate and automatic role in 
making authoritative local decisions on behalf of their 
communities becomes threatened. A central question is “if 
local authorities lack the corporate capacity to drive the 
new agenda, how can communities make up that shortfall?” 
Government has urged community engagement and 
empowerment, however the extent to which community 
participants are allowed into mainstream policy making 
structures is still rather limited. Representatives of the 
community may be self-selecting, and not always 
connected to, or representative of the wider community. 
Some breakthroughs have been made, within some local 
strategic partnerships, however as far as the citizen moving 
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centre stage, generally local authorities are still the 
dominant force, so one needs to ask whether it still 
represents its communities, given the low turnout at 
elections. The Improvement and Development Agency 
(2001) showed that nationally elected members are 
predominantly male (71%), and aged over 45 (86%), and it 
is debatable whether the voluntary and community sectors 
are more representative of the community than elected 
members (Improvement and Development Agency, 2001). 
There are enormous problems in switching from a local 
authority-led approach to one controlled by communities, 
not least because communities currently lack the capacities 
to take on these new challenges (Miliband, 1999). Indeed 
local politicians are sceptical, because community 
representatives are seen as self-interested individuals 
seeking resources, mainly monetary, for the furtherance of 
their own goals (Hutton, 1997). Community partnerships 
are diverse but still have only a small number of people 
assuming leading roles, and they are held in overall low 
regard by officers in public sector agencies (Colenutt and 
Cutten, 1994). 
There are practical difficulties of community 
involvement and some way to go before citizen-based 
advocacy becomes the norm. To involve people is 
extraordinarily difficult, in part because there is no agreed 
methodology on how to achieve this. Many local 
authorities have made efforts to increase community 
capacities, however local politicians are very realistic in 
managing aspirations in communities for fear of not being 
able to deliver against new, higher expectations: Some 
politicians have seen the new structures of local governance 
as a slow erosion of local democracy and concern is already 
being expressed that care needs to be taken not to create an 
alternative democratic system. Many politicians see 
themselves as community activists responding to views and 
issues within their communities, and this has changed the 
 
 role of elected members who now spend less time in 
cabinet or other committee meetings. The shift from 
representative to participative democracy is not entirely 
proven, as some members believe that their legitimacy 
comes from working on behalf of communities. The ballot 
box is still seen as a useful mechanism of accountability, 
but the growth in community partnerships and networks 
calls for other forms of legitimacy, scrutiny and 
accountability: 
On the positive side of partnership working, there are 
various attempts to unite around a shared agenda, and 
delegate responsibility for delivery nearer to communities. 
Less positively, some public servants are only just starting 
to cross their own organisational boundaries, despite the 
fact that future judgements about local government’s 
success will be based on its ability to work in partnership 
(North, 2001). Partnerships can be very effective in 
communities as a way of harnessing energy, they also allow 
agencies and communities to share agendas and constraints, 
or to receive feedback on plans Joint working is essential if 
issues are to be addressed holistically, but undeniably there 
will be conflicts between partners (Balloch aqnd Taylor, 
2001). 
There are local politicians who welcome the 
opportunity to provide “grass roots” views and enlighten 
communities. Conversely partnerships can detract from 
strong leadership and increase demands. Furthermore 
unwilling partners adopting a passive stance can sabotage 
progress. There is a real concern that local authorities 
continue to dominate and a desire to see more active 
involvement from the voluntary and business sectors, and 
local strategic partnerships are being encouraged to involve 
broader representation. They were created to agree a 
common set of priorities based on an understanding of an 
area’s specific difficulties; as a springboard for creative 
ideas; and, as a way of joining up services at a local level 
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whilst acknowledging the difficulties this presents. 
Moreover some local authorities think that the partnerships 
exist to validate their hastily made decisions, or to access 
new funds. 
Government policy is directed towards increasing levels 
of community participation in policy making, but a proven 
methodology is lacking and existing approaches conspire to 
limit aspiration and nurture dependency. Community 
leaders are increasingly being given opportunities to voice 
opinions, but there is a tendency towards community 
“consultation” and limited signs of “involvement”. 
Delegation of responsibility is rare and occurs at the 
margins of policy making, or in discrete and relatively 
small-scale community regeneration initiatives. The 
number of active community leaders varies and may be 
defined by existing initiatives, and they need mechanisms 
for validating their personal leadership role and the 
mandate they represent. There are considerable barriers that 
continue to exclude them from active participation.  
Local authorities remain the dominant organisations, 
but legitimacy is challenged due to low voter turnout and 
demographic profile of councillors. Elected members have 
emerged as community representatives, but they do accept 
that benefits can accrue from community involvement. 
There are links between participative and representative 
forms of governance. The need to regenerate impoverished 
locales has resulted in more partnership working spanning 
different sectors, however most are concerned with the 
sharing of information and plans, or consultation with other 
partners or communities. Actual decisions about activities 
tend to be made intra-organisationally rather than inter-
organisationally. Little progress has been made on joint 
planning, commissioning or procedures; there is no 
discernible shifting resources or responsibilities.  
The slow pace of progress, coupled with the concerns 
on measuring performance of partnership working is a real 
 
 concern with a distinct need for rationalisation and clearer 
objectives. Some partnerships provide the opportunity for 
financial gain, while others provide opportunities for under 
represented groups, but good leadership is essential to 
manage inclusivity. In future how well individual local 
authorities work in partnership will be a key criteria on 
their overall performance. 
Local strategic partnerships are a main plank of UK 
government policy and through active community 
involvement they are designed to overcome a perceived 
culture of dependency. They are acknowledged forums to 
agree shared priorities relating to an area’s specific 
problems, and provide a mechanism for joining up public 
services at a local level, but they will take some time to 
mature, but the requirement for a positive impact is 
immediate.  
As has already been discussed, these partnerships are 
forms of local governance, based on new ideas, different 
ways of working and approaches to problem solving. As 
such they have blurred existing boundaries, and challenged 
our existing notions of legitimacy, scrutiny and 
accountability.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has located the complexities of 
legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability within the new 
forms of national and local state governance. Like other 
European states, the UK has undergone massive 
transformation with the drive towards modernising its 
public services, and the traditional lines of accountability 
are ever more complicated, and are now as blurred as the 
boundaries within which state actors are exhorted to work 
alongside non state actors. 
The managerialist state based largely on neo--liberal 
assumptions and business--like policies, innovative and 
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experimental, reconfigured and re-engineered forms of 
governance, fostered by the Blair administration, and given 
expression through New Public Management, has replaced 
the traditional top-down, command hierarchies, but 
increased the ambiguities on which agencies or individuals 
should provide an account of activities, and to whom must 
they be accountable. 
New arrangements in which state and non-state 
actors work together across organisational boundaries to 
achieve commonly agreed objectives have exposed gaps in 
institutional coverage and challenged the democratic 
legitimacy of both state and non- state actors, as scrutiny 
and accountability remain key unresolved issues at the 
heart of modernisation of the British state. As state officials 
now draw in personnel, resources and information from 
non-state actors and share “democratic action spaces”, the 
new relationships and responsibilities have altered 
democratic engagement and patterns of legitimacy. 
  Many of the problems facing the British state 
cannot be solved solely by state agencies, and the multi-
faceted social, economic and environmental nature of 
intractable problems, the rapidity of global changes, the 
escalation in citizen and consumer demands, and broader 
variety of partnerships have apparently become the new 
drivers of effective and efficient resource distribution. 
However, the need to encourage more creative and 
innovative ways of working and new approaches to 
problem solving have challenged how we view democratic 
legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability, by bringing them 
into sharper focus. 
The article has argued that despite the on going 
conceptual debates surrounding democratic legitimacy, 
scrutiny and accountability, there is evidence to suggest 
that as the context of governance continues to change, more 
and more state functions are contracted out, privatised, or 
delivered by combinations of state and non--state actors or 
 
 agencies we need to rethink our views on legitimacy, 
scrutiny and accountability. While states continue to divest 
financial and managerial responsibilities and measure 
performance on market driven criteria such as 
consumerism, competition, efficiency and value for money 
questions remain on issues of equity and public interest.  
It has been suggested that New Public Service or 
New Public Governance models offer viable alternatives to 
counteract the dichotomous relationship between the 
traditional public administration and New Public 
Management. They highlight the challenges to existing 
forms of legitimacy, scrutiny and accountability. The 
emerging requirement for greater public participation in 
public service improvement enhances democratic 
citizenship, community, and civil society, and provides a 
model quite different from those traditional bureaucracies 
controlled by top-down mechanisms.  
Both NPS and NPG are viable alternatives to the 
traditional bureaucratic and more recently dominant NPM, 
because they both emphasise that public sector 
organisations should be organised in such a way that public 
servants are not responsive to ‘constituents and clients’, nor 
to ‘customers’, but to ‘citizens’. With citizens at the 
forefront, the emphasis in NPS should not be placed on 
either steering (NPM) or rowing (public administration) the 
governmental boat (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), but rather 
on building public institutions marked by integrity and 
responsiveness. Because accountability involves complex 
constellations of institutions and standards, there is a need 
to collaborate on shared decision--making, but this must be 
based on a notion of strengthening democratic control and 
increased citizen involvement, as well as improving public 
trust in government institutions and types of services 
provided. 
 
  
426 PAQ WINTER 2007 
REFERENCES 
 
Attwood, M., Pedler, M., Pritchard, S., and Wilkinson, D. 
(2003). Leading Change:  A Guide to Whole 
Systems Working. Bristol, UK: Policy Press. 
Balloch, S. and M. Taylor (2001). Partnership Working: 
Policy and Practice. Bristol, UK: Policy Press. 
Blair, T. (British Prime Minister) (1998). Letter addressed 
to Head of the Home Civil Service and Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson; Cabinet Office, 
Whitehall, London, October. 
Chapman, R.A. (1993). “Governance, Scrutiny and 
Accountability, Ethics in the Public Sector.” 
Politeia 12 (2): 28-42. 
Clarke, J. (2003). “Scrutiny through Inspection and Audit,” 
in T. Bovaird and E. Loeffler (eds.), Public 
Management and Governance.  London: Routledge. 
Colenutt, B. and A. Cutten (1994). “Community 
Empowerment in Vogue or Vain.” Local Economy 
9(3): 236-250. 
Cope, S. and J. Goodship (1999). “Regulating 
Collaborative Government: Towards Joined Up 
Government.” Public Policy and Administration 
14(2): 3-16. 
Denhardt, R.B. amd J.V.  Denhardt (2000). “The New 
Public Service: Serving Rather Than Steering.” 
Public Administration Review 60(6): 549-559.  
Friend, J.K., J.M. Power, and C.J.L. Yewlett (1974). Public 
Planning: The Intercorporate Dimension. 
Birmingham: Tavistock. 
Geddes, M. (1997). Partnerships against Poverty and 
Exclusion. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Gray, A.G. (1998). Business-like but not Like a Business: 
The Challenge for Public Management. London: 
Public Finance Foundation/CIPFA. 
 
 
 Hirst P. (2000). “Democracy and Governance,” in J. Pierre 
(ed.), Debating Governance. Authority, Steering 
and Democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.  
Hirst, P. (1997). From Statism to Pluralism. London: UCL 
Press. 
House of Commons, Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2003-4 (2003). “A Draft Civil Service 
Bill: Completing the Reform.” First Report of 
Session 2003-4 (Vol. I). London: The Stationery 
Office, HMSO. 
Hutton, W. (1997). The State to Come. Chatham: Vintage. 
Improvement and Development Agency (2001). 
Benchmark of the ‘Ideal’ Local Authority. 3rd 
edition. August 2001. Available at: 
[www.idea.gov.uk] 
John, P. (2001). Local Governance in Western Europe. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Leach, S. and D.F. Norris (2003). “Elected Mayors on 
England: A Contribution to the Debate.” Public 
Policy and Administration 17(1): 21-39. 
Maddock, S. (2002). “Making Modernisation Work: New 
Narratives, Change Strategies and People 
Management in the Public Sector.” International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 15(1): 13-44. 
McGarvey, N. (2001). “Accountability in Public 
Administration: A Multi-Perspective Framework for 
Analysis.” Public Policy and Administration 16(2): 
17-28. 
Miliband, D. (1999). “This is a Modern World.” Fabian 
Review 111(4): 11-13. 
Moran, M. (2000). “The Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture: 
From Command State to Regulatory State.” Public 
Policy and Administration 15(4): 1-14. 
 
  
428 PAQ WINTER 2007 
 
Mulgan, R.  (2000). “Accountability: An Ever Expanding 
Concept.” Public Administration 78(3): 555-573. 
Norman, R. (2003). Obedient Servants? Management 
Freedoms and Accountabilities in the New Zealand 
Public Sector. New Zealand: Victoria University 
Press. 
North, P. (2001). “Conflict within Regeneration 
Partnerships: A Help or Hindrance?” Paper 
presented at the Second Regeneration Management 
Research Workshop, November, University of 
Durham Business School, Durham, United 
Kingdom. 
Osborne, D. And T. Gaebler (1992). Reinventing 
Government. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Rogers, S. (1990). Performance Management in Local 
Government. London: Longman. 
Salet, W., A. Thornley, and A. Kreukels (eds.), (2003). 
Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning. 
Comparative Case Studies of European City-
Regions. London: Spon Press. 
Schedler, K. (2000). “Keynote Speech.” Delivered at 
International Symposium of Public Sector Research, 
April, University of Edinburgh, UK. 
Southern, R. (2003). “Understanding Multi-sector 
Regeneration Partnerships as a Form of Local 
Governance.” Local Government Studies 28(2): 16-
32. 
Stewart, J. (1992). “Accountability.” Speech delivered at 
the Accountability to the Public Conference, Queen 
Elizabeth 2 Conference Centre, Westminster, 
London. 
Taket, A. and L. White (2000). Partnership and 
Participation: Decision-making in the Multi-agency 
Setting. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
 
